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Introduction
On October 6th and 7th, 1961, Freedom House sponsored a Freedom Assembly for the purpose of exploring major problem/:; of U. S. foreign policy. Following
the presentation of the organization's annual Freedom Award to Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin,
a number of the nation's most distinguished experts
and opinion ieaders in the field of international affairs
joined in discussing various aspects of foreign policy.
Their task was to determine priorities and directions
for strategy in the struggle between the free world
and Communism. This is a report on what they said,
condensed and edited from their prepared speeches
and extemporaneous remarks.

Among the participants were:
The Hon. JAMES J. WADSWORTH, former U. S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, who delivered the keynote address.
The Hon. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., former Assistant
Secretary of State, who led the discussion group
on Ideology.
Dr. HENRY A. KISSINGER, of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, who led
the discussion group on Political Goals.
Dr. WILLIAM R. KINTNER, deputy director of the
University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Research Institute, who led the discussion group
on Military Factors.
LEO CHERNE, executive director of the Research
Institute of America, who led the discussion
group on Economics.
The Hon. GEORGE V. ALLEN, former director of
the United States Information Agency, who
led the discussion group on Psychological
Approaches.
Dr. HARRY D. GIDEONSE, president of Brooklyn
College and president of Freedom House, who
delivered the summation address.
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WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, past president of
the American Bar Association, who presided at
the closing session.
ROSCOE DRUMMOND, Washington correspondent
and columnist, Chairman of the Board, Freedom
House.
The Hon. ROGER TUBBY, Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs.
Dr. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University.
PAUL M. DEAC, vice president of the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups.
AMROM H. KATZ, Electronics Department of the
RAND Corporation.
HERBERT HARRIS, director of Public Affairs, Institute of Aerospace Sciences.
Dr. PHILIP E. MOSELY, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.
EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER, columnist and writer on
foreign affairs.
STACY MAY, economist and author.
Mrs. BONARO OVERSTREET, author and lecturer.
JOHN RICHARDSON, JR., president of the Free
Europe Committee.
CHRISTOPHER EMMET, chairman, American
Friends of the Captive Nations.
Dr. HUGH WOLF, director, Office of Publications,
American Institute of Physics.
(Other members and guests of the Board of Directors
of Freedom House.)
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THE KEYNOTE:
Yardsticks for the Free World
AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH: An assembly like
this does not make decisions for the nation; only the
chosen leaders can do that. But perhaps the first
article in our freedom's charter is that those leaders
must know what the citizenry thinks.
We are conscious of the weaknesses in our posture
and aware that the free world has yet to find how
to mobilize and capitalize on its real strengths.
What are these weaknesses and vulnerabilities?
First, we have not been adequately aware that
rising revulsion at the thought of global atomic war
has been turned to good account by an opponent who
apparently does not suffer equal revulsion. Some of
our reactions have been born of naivete, like our
earlier assumption that the opponent is fundamentally a reasonable creature. And some have come out of
inertia, as we turned from each crisis we survived
with little or no planning tor the next.
In total impact, these shortcomings could be disastrous. When the opponent turns each act of reasonableness on our part into an invitation to increase
his pressure on us, and uses each act of firmness as
an excuse for countermeasures, it is obvious that we
need something more than a lament over his intransigence or an anxious questioning of whether he
really means what he threatens.
It serves no purpose to protest that many things are

beyond our control. If we are becoming less secure,
less effective, it is not enough simply to complain.
We must explore revisions in what we do and how
we do it.
We are doing much. But much of what we do is
simply "for its own sake," and with little consideration for the relationship to other things we are doing.
Moreover, many societies including ours are only
partially mobiliz.e.d, and parts of them are still
dreaming in terms that have been ·o bsolete for some
time. The primary need, therefore, is for a tyingtogether and a balancing and for a more unified sense
of direction-in a sense, orchestration. Formal organization is only part of the problem. We cannot look to
someone in our government to come up with the
magic device which will blend. everything into one
"mix" painlessly and with no loose ends. Organization will come only when we as a people have decided
on the character of the business at hand and what
the priorities ought to be if freedom is to prevail
tomorrow and fifty years from now.
To make a contribution to that decision is our purpose. Part of our problem has been clarified for us by
8

the opponent himself. By throwing down the gage to
us in Berlin f by making clear that he is challenging
not merely the rights of Germans, as he did thirteen
years ago, but our own rights, our own solemn word
and sacred honor, he has made it unnecessary for us
to "run against peace," as the saying used to go.
Berlin, we must remind ourselves, is neither remote
nor only fitfully in the public attention. A defeat
there cannot be hidden behind the jargon of compromise; its effects will not be delayed but immediate.
Let us remind ourselves that it is late, that justifiably
or not the Communists ar.e running with great selfconfidence, that their assessment of us and our will
to respond is still dangerously low.
They are mistaken, of course. Weare not going to
crumble before them in Berlin or anywhere else, and
we are going to come through this crisis with honor.
But in addition to Berlin, it is what lies beyond that
concerns us. This must be the last crisis we enter
unprepared.
Our theme is "How Free Men Can Prevail." It is not
how they can muddle through this year or how they
can escape with their skins or how Boon they can
settle back into the more comfortable ways of living.
"To prevail" means "to win," and that means to have
a plan, a flexible strategy and a structure of priorities
upon which the strategy is applied.
We here probably will not write a strategy, and
certainly not a full policy, but we may suggest
emphasis and priorities. We may thus emerge from
our discussions with some yardsticks against which
we can measure the success of our policies in the days
to come. If we succeed, we may help make it a little
easier to translate lofty purposes into effective action.

The Problems We Face
Mr. TUBBY: In considering topics that fall within
the discussion areas of our five working groups we
find no lack of foreign relations problems. Here are
some of them:
How to avoid either war or surrender.
How to achieve disarmament or a ban on nuclear
testing with effective controls.
How to strengthen the United Nations.
How to check Communist aggression or subversion
in Southeast Asia or anywhere else.
How to broaden the economic or social base in many
countries still in an early stage of economic
development.
How to reach their intellectuals and win their respect
and understanding.
How to deal with satellite countries.
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What to do about U. S. economic aid to so-called
neutrals which appear to support Moscow.
How to reserve outer space for peaceful use.
How to end colonialism-under the Russians or Red
Chinese or anyone else.
How to make the new Alliance for Progress for Latin
America a success.

IDEOLOGY:
The Myth of World Opinion
Mr. BERLE: In dealing with the Cold War, we must
begin by discarding a lot of sanctified myths.
First, there is the myth of world opinion. What is
called "world opinion" often turns out to be mostly
propaganda bought and paid for. Americans for some
reason are supposed to take speeches of foreign
politicians and pr.ess accounts of "popular" demonstrations as showing world opinion on issues in the
Cold War. When you go to the countries involved you
discover that the much-touted politician represents
no opinion but his own, or that of a small noisy
group around him.
"Demonstrations" usually are equally fictitious. In
most countries they can be cooked up by a couple of
organiz.ers with a little money and a few trained
assistants. The Communist powers have even got out
"how to do it" handbooks of instructions. In the
demonstrations at the time of Lumumba's death,
inquiry developed that some demonstrators did not
know who Lumumba was or anything else about him.
They were merely being paid a trifle to yell and break
windows and were earning their money. The "crowds"
were the sidewalk superintendents who gather anywhere. It was all in the instruction book.

Leaders Versus the People
There is, of course, a true body of opinion in literate
countries-and even to a lesser degree in non-literate
countries. It generally has little to do with what comes
out of the noise-machine. The Belgrade conf.erence of
so-called neutral nations was a star illustration of
the difference between the two. The elements in these
countries-indeed, in all countries-which know anything about testing of nuclear bombs knew it brought
the world closer to atomic destruction, and practically
all knew that the Soviet Union had announced such
tests and had begun exploding the bombs. They
violently disapproved. Yet their representatives at
Belgrade soft-pedalled or ran away from the problem.
In blunt fact, these politicians did not dare to represent the opinion of their people.
5

A related myth is the assumption that personalities
able to make headlmes are powerful voices of the
opinion of their countries. When you visit their
countries, you often discover they are not even
regarded as very important. Lumumba, for example,
was never the voice of the Congo. His death there
produced about the same result as did the death of
Al Capone in Chicago. In the same way, I doubt
whether anyone now speaks for the people in Laos,
or Haiti.
So our problem is to distinguish real from fake
ide.ology. There are, I am sure, certain currents of
motion and thought widely followed throughout the
world. Essentially they deal with objectives and
hopes, and they have little to do with the temporary
emotional outbreaks of occasional mob operations.
It is true, I believe, that most peoples want to better
their lot. This simple fact is often blown up into an
assumed social revolution sweeping the world. The
fact is that although most popUlations want their lot
improved, few want the waste and cruelty that go
with bloody revolution. Where revolutions of that
kind occur, you find later most of the participants
have been forced into it by the most ferocious intimidation. The humble people usually have quite rational
solutions for their problems, and these rarely involve
killing.

Are Nations Friendly 7
So, I suggest, Americans should be careful in accepting claimed ideological commitment as serious political fact. In dealing with foreign nations, whatever
their ideology, our first question must be whether the
nation is fundamentally friendly to the United States,
and whether its regime is viable enough to make
friendship desirable.
We can work-and have worked-quite comfortably
with socialist countries. Possibly we could work quite
comfortably with a Communist country-if it was
friendly to us, was not a pumping station for hatred
and disorder toward its neighbors or a colony of some
power hostile to the United States, and had a decent
respect for human rights. We have not yet had that
opportunity.
My proposal accordingly is this: In studying ideological conflict, let us first draw a sharp distinction
between the ends which the ideology purports to
serve and the means proposed or used to achieve
these ends. The great principle behind President
Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" in Latin America
was to concentrate on the ends sought. These ends,
agreed on by all independent Latin American
countries, include lifting the standard of living of the
entire region. Because methods of social organization
6

differ, each country was asked to work out its method
of achieving those ends. Recently President Kennedy
indicated that in foreign aid programs we also had a
right to consider whether the country proposed to be
a friend or an enemy of the United States. Obviously
the United States can be of little help to a country
whose methods involve reckless violation of human
rights, or whose government asserts that it proposes
to be hostile to us whenever expedient.

Some Ideological Criteria
The United States has the right if not the duty to
propose its own ideological approach. But where its
methods are not adopted, it has three criteria to apply
to ideologies put forward by other countries:
First: Do the endJ sought by the nation conform to
standards we can accept? For example, we could not
accept the ends proposed by the Nazi-Fascist regimes
twenty years ago, nor could we work with that
ideology now.
Second: Do the means proposed offer a reasonable
basis for assuming that the acceptable ends will be
reached? We cannot, for example, accept ideology
motivated primarily by currents of hatred which
Communist dogma presently assumes as necessary to
keep Communism alive.
Third: Are the ends and means consistent with the
reasonable national interests of a United States which
does not wish to conquer the world, which does not
have colonies, which does desire a rising measure of
human welfare abroad as well as at home, and does
desire to remain at peace if the aggressor powers will
abandon Hitlerian ideas of world conquest?
These, I suggest, are the questions to be answered as
increasingly we move into a world of nations seeking
solutions for their social and political problems.
Mrs. OVERSTREET: I wonder whether we don't
have in our American tradition a proper way of
addressing ourselv:es to world opinion-even if it
doesn't exist, so to speak, and even if it hasn't been
formulated everywhere. It has been said here that a
decent respect for the opinions ·o f mankind requires
that we declare the causes that impel us. Is it not our
obligation then to make the clearest, most precise
statement of why we do what we do, rather than to
look to some hypothetical opinion as a determinant
of what w.e should do? It does not seem reasonable, as
Mr. Berle has pointed out, that every time someone
somewhere, says "This is world opinion," we stop in
our tracks and wonder whether we shouldn't reformulate our policy in accordance with it. Our obligation is rather to respect the minds of men enough to
help them get the facts, as best we can, and to speak
up with our reasons for doing what we intend to do.
7

Mr. DRUMMOND: How does one determine what
American opinion is? Inevitably, there is a divergence
in our appraisals of how we should deal with Soviet
objectives, on the part of the political and intellectual
leadership of this country-a difference of opinion
between, say, Walter Lippmann on the one hand and
David Lawrence on the other.
In my opinion, today, as in many crises of the nation
in the past, American public opinion has been ahead
of American political leadership. That was true in
1939, prior to World War II; I think it was often ~e
during the Eisenhower Administration; and I think
it is true today. The President of the United States
is rightly feeling the pressure of a national consensus
to stand firmer than he has been with respect to
Soviet threats in different parts of the world. The
problem, ther.efore, is not primarily to create a
consensus of public opinion, but to bring the influence
of public opinion to bear upon our national leadership.
Mr. CHERNE: I agree that the great bulk of ~e
people is far ahead of the government. It is precisely
for this reason that I am concerned with another
group-an articulate, effective segment of the community that does not fit under the umbrella Mr.
Drummond has provided. To me, one of the most
disturbing illustrations of our dilemma in this respect
can be found in a photograph that recently appeared
in the newspapers. It showed the faces of happy,
smiling, adoring young American girls who had
enjoyed the marvelous opportunity to meet with Mrs.
Khrushchev-and to be assured by her that in fact
the Soviet Union does not contemplate war, as is
evidenced by the fact that they are not building bomb
shelters. The faces of those girls crystallizes an
important aspect of our dilemma. We have been
vulnerable to Soviet propaganda and many of our
people get bamboozled by the Russians without being
aware of it.
Dr. MOSELY: I too have a differ.ent impression from
Mr. Drummond's.
In some respects our public opinion is extremely confused. In many parts of the country where I speak I
find that a great many people still assume we have a
unilateral deterrent which we can use in any way we
want--that, somehow, this is the decisive factor. They
seem ignorant of our movement into a period of
bilateral deterrents, or mutual deterrents, and seem
to assume we have an exclusive power that we somehow should use at any time, for any question, just to
have it co~e out the way we want. This represents a
very large body of opinion.
Then there is another body of opinion which is more
concerned with finding enemies at home than it is
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with facing up to our dangers abroad, because this
looks a lot easier to handle and it is closer at hand.
There is a real movement in .many parts of the
country toward a kind of new isolationism, based on
the belief that we can't do anything abroad until we
settle our problems at home.
There is in addition a very small-but in time of
crisis possibly influential-body of thought pressing
for unilateral disarmament, apparently on the ground
that no one could want to destroy us because we are
good people, and we wouldn't want to destroy anyone
else.

The Meaning of Words
Mr. MOWRER: I would like to suggest that we are
losing another part of the ideological battle, involving
the uses and meanings of words. Some of the confusion has been cleared up in the last year or so by
the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, but
to a great extent it still prevails. It seems to me that
we have been remiss in accepting the use of certain
words as they were given out either by Communists,
or by Mrican anti-colonialists or other groups. For
instance, we are told that all the peoples on earth
want to be "free." But that obviously isn't so if by
freedom you mean personal freedom, for in many of
the new countries they have far less personal freedom
than they had as colonies.
It seems to me that .our authorities should explain-

both abroad and to Americans-that national independence and personal freedom are two quite different
things. We Americans happen to confuse them because in 1776 you could equate independence from the
British with personal freedom. But in many of the
newly independent countries, notably Guinea and
Mali, the drop in personal freedom from what they
had under the French is fantastic. They may prefer
national independence under native tyrants to more
freedom under foreigners. That is perhaps understandable--but we Americans must recognize that
there is a great difference.
A second phrase which is being thrown at us by
Marxists and their disciples all over the world (even
when they claim not to be Marxists) is "economic
exploitation." As they use it, the phrase is largely
buncombe. There is no question, for example, that the
people of Katanga had the highest living standard of
any black people in Mrica. That may be "exploitation" by the Belgians or the copp.e r companies, but if
so you have got to redefine "exploitation." If they
mean that the Katangese were not as rich as they
would have been if the Belgians had not taken any
money and instead had divided it all, that is true;
but I doubt if you would have gotten the Belgians and
9

other people to dev.elop the region on that basis.
In the same way, we were told Cuba was cruelly
exploited by Batista. Batista was an unpleasant
tyrant. The fact remains that Cuba had the second
highest living standard in all of Latin America.
A Long Range Obiective
Dr. BRZEZINSKI: One of our difficulties is a tendency to think in non-ideological terms. Against the
kind of opponent we face, such thinking can have
disastrous political consequences. F'o r example, it
seems to me we are in considerable danger right now
of being faced, in the foreseeable future, with a situation whereby we remain in West Berlin but lose West
Germany. The reason for this is we do tend to think
in non-ideological terms, unaware of the ultimate
significance of our actions. This forces us into a
position of being essentially a reactive power, unlike
the U.S.S.R. which has some notion of the pattern of
change in world politics and has some sense of
priorities in relationships to that pattern.
For instance, by insisting primarily on the defense of
our rights in Berlin, we misconstrue the very longrange notion that the Soviets have. By forcing us
gradually, step by step, to accept the status quo in
Central Europe-particularly by forcing us to deal
with East Germany only on a de facto basis-they
hope to set in motion a chain of events in West Germany which could begin to undermine the Western
Alliance, NATO, the Common Market, and all of the
Western unity that has been fashioned with so much
effort and dedication in the last fifteen years.
We have come to recognize the Soviet Union as our
opponent. On this, there is national agreement and a
sense of national will. But there is no sense of
national understanding of our own position vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet bloc. There has
not been a sense of national identification in terms of
what we ought to be accomplishing.
Much of our action, both in the Eisenhower Administration and the Kennedy Administration, is rooted in
the ambivalence between our feeling on the one hand
that we ought to be opponents of the Soviet Union
and on the other that we ought to be civilizing the
Soviet Union and adjusting the Russians to our
pattern of behavior in the international community.
This ambivalence paralyzes us and prevents us from
taking the initiative. If we had a long-range image
of the world and a sense of priorities, if we were
thinking ideologically, we might take the initiative.
The Berlin crisis has opened up a variety of opportunities for us to act forthrightly in an area of the
world in which the Soviet Union a priori has been
objectively handicapped. We could have done this by
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initiating proposals between East Germany and
European Germany on political and economic relations
in those areas. Instead, we maintain a position of
rigidity-thereby rigidifying the Soviet position and
creating ambiguity in our own camp.
This is primarily a result of the fact that we do not
have any long-range programmatic sense of dedication in international politics. We are dealing with an
opponent who has some sort of ideology. Perhaps it
is a myth, as Mr. Berle said, but in many respects it
is extremely relevant to the international politics of
the age, to the economic development of nations. And
the orientation of the so-called Western democracies
is built on a bourgeois, non-ideological middle-class,
used to the principles of compromise and adjustment.
In that sense we are yielding to the other side, starting with a handicap which we will not overcome if
we insist on labeling all ideology a myth and insist
instead on a dogmatically undogmatic stand.

POLITICAL GOALS:
Reality in the New Nations
Dr. KISSINGER: We hear today, regarding the
Berlin issue and a number of others, a great deal
about the need for realism and the need to adjust to
facts which we are powerless to change. Nothing in
the world would ever have been changed if this
notion were to prevail. It reflects the views of a
society which is satisfied with the status quo and to
which any basic change is reasonably uncomfortable;
and it .e xplains in its deepest sense why our attitude
can appear both peaceful and irrelevant to the new
nations.
To us, in a middle-class society in the United States,
the reality that is most significant is the reality we
see around us. To us, realism consists in adjustment.
Our eminent people are people who have known how
to operate in an existing system. The worst penalty
they learn in their liv.es is transfer to another department if they don't do well in the one they are in.
To the Communists and to many people in new
nations, the most significant reality is the future.
What they see around them is ephemeral. If you had
asked, in 1913, who are these ridiculous people in
Geneva, translating German texts, going to congresses, splitting hairs about abstruse points of
Leninist doctrine, any Western businessman would
have said, "These are ridiculous fanatics." Yet, three
years later they changed history because they had a
conviction; they had a sense of the future. Their
reality was not where they were, but where they
were going.
11

In Defense of the Neutrals
I would like to say a word about the stand taken by
the neutral nations at the Belgrade meeting in September 1961. There have been a few comments here
that the behavior of these nations at Belgrade was
morally wrong. I would like to come somewhat to
their defense. We had no right to expect them to
behave very much differently from the way they did.
We had no right to act as if international relations
were a debate in the Oxford Union, with the uncommitted sitting in the referee's chair and awarding
a prize after they had heard all the arguments. It
was against all reason to expect that nations barely
come into independence could suddenly play a global
role and make wise judgments on the whole range of
international problems. Our sentimentality and our
illusion has projected them into a role that they
cannot fulfill, and that must wreck their domestic
stability if they try to fulfill it.
If anyone asks himself why the new nations behaved
this way, he should look back a short twenty-two
years ago. Was it conceivable that the United States
would have supported Great Britain in 1939? Did
there exist any British policy that would have induced us to enter the war on the British side on the
issue of Danzig? Where would the world have
been in 1939 if Great Britain had said that it would
fight against Nazism only if the United States. supported the fight? No abstract arguments could possibly have achieved American support for Great
Britain in 1939 on the issues which w.ere of most
consequence to the world in that day. And no American policy can get the kind of support many people
were expecting out of the Belgrade powers. By the
nature of their society, by the nature of their preoccupation, they cannot play a global role. They
cannot provide a substitute for our for.eign policy.
Consider their dilemma regarding disarmament. We
have been criticized for not studying this problem
carefully. Well, we have a statutory ag.ency and over
100 full-time professionals at work on the problem.
I don't believe a single one of the emergent nations
has one ftill-time person studying disarmament on a
regular basis. Under the circumstances we cannot
expect them to come up with a formula, and we
cannot expect them to be the arbiters of all disputes.

The Man Who Leads a Revolution
I think the new nations are not psychologically in
tune with our concern with stability. For this reason,
we have enormous difficulty conveying what we stand
for to these people. If Castro had wanted stability,
if Castro had wanted security, he could have been a
bank president in Havana today. In the social circles
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he comes from this choice was open to him. The kind
of man that goes into the mountains, the kind of
man who leads a revolution is not a pleasant, middleclass intellectual disputing abstruse or abstract
points of political doctrine. Very few revolutionaries
make a r.evolution in order to bring into power a
form of government which will make them dispensable. Most of them undergo the suffering which
is inseparable from revolution in order to be able to
exercise power.
I don't agree with those who say that the exclusive
motivation of the new -countries is to raise their
standard of living. I think this is only one of their
preoccupations. They are involved with the problem
of political legitimacy, with their notions of social
justice and their conception of the future they will
have. It is these preoccupations that have made it so
very hard for us to understand either the revolution
in the new countries or the nature of the Communist
challenge.

Mr. MOWRER: We must remember that our pOiition
as a major power brings with it certain unavoidable
risks. I submit that at the moment we are in an
impossible situation. We are struggling between two
admirable, but perhaps incompatible, ideals. In the
first place, we are passionately pursuing the cause of
peace. In this pursuit we are prepared to envisage
partial retreats, partial surrenders. We have been
making invisible-and not so invisible-retreats ever
since 1944. It has gotten us nowhere but backwards.
On the other hand, we stand committed to the defense
and the extension of world freedom. If we are going
to seek the extension of freedom against an adversary whose chief weapon is brinkman!hip based on
bigger and bigger nuclear devices, we will have to
call his bluff and go to the edge of war, not once, but
many times.
If we are to extend freedom, we will have to begin

applying to the adversary the kind of treatment that
he applies to us. I do not mean, of course, that we
should have burned Germans in this country in World
War II simply because we were at war with Hitler.
However, we took war measures which shocked many
people because our military authorities were convinced we had to do so to survive. My point is that
today we will not be able to prevail and extend
freedom if we merely try to dig in.

"Call the Game Off"
Every time the adversary lines up to try to break
through somewhere or to make a pass over us, we
say "Let's call the game off," and go home to Thanksgiving dinner.
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I think we are coming to the place where we. as a
people, have to decide on the character of the business
at hand and what the priorities ought to be. Winning
the cold war does not exclude preventing nuclear war;
but it means taking the risk of it. On the other hand,
too passionate a pursuit of peace leads inevitably to
piecemeal surrenders, if the past is any guide.
Mr. CHERNE: When we talk of political goals as they
affect the two Germanies let us understand what we
are talking about. Weare talking of a Communist
Germany and one that is not Communist. To accept
these as "realities" means that we are accepting (and
I am perfectly ready to debate whether perhaps we
should) a Communist Germany. More important, we
are accepting permanent Soviet sovereignty over the
entire bloc of Central European nations. That is what
is at issue.
But what is it that Russia wants? It has been suggested that the Soviet Union wishes a reduction of
tension in that area of the world, and I agree. If you
are sitting as a jailer of 100 million people, you are
in daily dread there may be prison riots. Of course,
they want a reduction of tension.
What the Soviet Union is after, then, is a division of
Germany-half Communist, half not--and permanent
Western acceptance of Soviet sovereignty over the
Central European states. In the present situation it
would be prudent for us to pay heed to a statement
made recently by a Soviet diplomat at the United
Nations in a private conversation. He said, "Americans are very odd people. They desperately try to find
out what it is we want and then they hand it to us as
an ultimatum."

MILITARY FACTORS:
The High Price of Protection
Dr. KINTNER: The mobilization potential of this
nation-not only military~- but political, moral and
psychological-is not being fully utilized. Unless it
is, we may face ultimate disaster.
Somehow the possibility of American us"e of nuclear
weapons has, in some circles, been made to appear
like a morally reprehensible act. This is the equivalent
of deciding that there is no issue worth fighting for,
under any circumstances. In that case, the values of
our society are meaningless. First you decide that this
issue is not that important, then that some other issue
is not that important--and eventually that nothing is
that important. Under such circumstances the whole
moral and spiritual structure of our society adds up
to zero.
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There are several respects in which U. S. policy has
been remiss:
1. Although we have said we are shifting our main
reliance from nuclear weapons back to conventional
arms, neither our allies nor our opponents are prepared to believe it. They realize that despite the
verbal change in policy it would take three or four
years to make this fundamental adjustment in U. S.
military posture.
2. In the effort to rule out the accidental triggering
of nuclear war we have placed so many restrictions
on the nuclear arsenal that we may wind up by convincing the enemy that we do not intend to use this
power at all, under any circumstances.
3. Ther.e has been some increase in our capability for
waging guerrilla warfare, at the bottom of the conflict spectrum. But the great middle ground-bulk,
visible, conventional power which you are willing to
use-is still the fundamental military weakness of
the Western world. The Soviets and the Chinese
Communists are exploiting thei~ advantage in this
sector politically, in Berlin and in Southeast Asia.
4. Although some good work is being done on defense
against fallout, particularly in utilizing existing
structures for community shelters, the confusion
r.e.g arding backyard shelters could have been avoided.
5. In the anti-missile field our pace has been far too
slow and too cautious. We insist that each step in the
development of our principal defensive missile, the
Nike-Zeus, be checked out before going on to the
next--a process we have abandoned with offensive
missiles.

Advantages on Both Sides
Those are specifics. In assessing U. S. military policy
generally, it is necessary to consider the fundamental
differences between the Soviet system and ours and to
weigh the advantages of each.
In favor of the U.S.S.R. there is first the fact that
the Soviets make central allocation of their resources
primarily to improve and pursue their power advantage. As of now, this country and the Soviet Union
are spending approximately the same amount of
money in the military field. But the Soviet leaders
can allocate this money as they see fit. In the United
States roughly 20 per cent of the gross national
product belongs to the federal government for its
use; half of federal income is used for other purposes.
So the relative amount ·of resources allocated for
power actually is lower on our side.
Also favoring the Soviets is the centralization of
strategy decisions. U. S. strategy is worked up
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separately by various departments with general coordination at the White House. But since everyone
tries to get in on the act, we tend toward compromises
which mean all things to all people. In conflict,
strategy by committee generally is not effective. The
conflict managers of the Soviet Union, on the other
hand, sit in the Presidium with Mr. Khrushchev and
his immediate cabal. They work out their plans, and
then they use the entire resources of the Soviet State
to implement their strategy. This has given them a
major advantage.
The U. S., for its part, has three main advantages of
its own. First, as long as we occupy or have access to
areas in the Eurasian land mass, geography is
decidedly with us. Even in the space and missile age,
geography is meaningful from the point of view of
communications, tracking, warning, and other factors.
Our geographical access also permits us to retain an
effective alliance with the Japanese in the Far East
and the NATO nations in Western Europe. If this
advantage were to be turned against Ui, if we were
ever euchred out of the Eurasian land mass, then the
balance would go decisively the other way. This is
why the Soviets are trying to eliminate our access to
Eurasia by their variety of plays in the cold warthe elimination of the base system, and so forthand why, also, these engagements in strange and
faraway places, such as Laos or the Congo, have an
important security meaning to us regardless of any
of the political considerations involved.
The second advantage we have is our tremendous
economic resource. Our economy is operating at
around 80 or 85 per cent of capacity. We have
untapped reserves, human and material, which, if
we wanted to use them, could give us the means to
work our way out of the insecure position we find
ourselves in at present.
A third factor working for us is our system of values.
Our society, with its traditions and its spiritual and
political concepts, comes far closer to striking a
responsive chord among people .e verywhere than anything the dialectic materialists have to offer on the
other side of the fence. Yet we have been extremely
reluctant to advance our values or even engage in
ideological discussions. Because of the threat of
thermonuclear war, we have even come to believe
that perhaps values are not important; that maybe
our skin is more important than what we believe in.

Strategic Imagination
If used fully, our advantages give us, I believe, a
commanding position in the Gold War. But beyond
these advantages is another element which might be
decisive. That is the factor of "strategic imagination"
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-the ability of one side to make better technological
choices than the other. This means the ability to
select from the bewildering array of weapons and
weapons designs those that would prevail.
Two additional factors are also crucial:
The first is our no-first-blow policy. One problem
with this policy is that it tends to mislead us into
attributing to the enemy a similar reluctance to
initiate a first strike. The no-first-blow policy also
exacts a high pric~. You may require a defensive
establishment one and one-half times as great as
now in order to prevail after absorbing a devastating
thermonuclear attack. We have been unwilling to
accept that logic. I have nothing against the no-firstblow policy-provided we are willing to pay the price.
A final factor of great importance is timing. New
threats must be foreseen, and prudent steps taken in
advance to meet them. In the case of the Soviet
missile threat, U. S. defensive reactions were too
slow.
The price of proper military preparation comes high,
and I doubt that the present administration is any
more ready than the last to pay it. The announcement
that there will be military cutbacks after the current
Berlin crisis has passed, for example, hardly squared
with earlier announcements that we can expect continual crises and will be prepared for them.
Mr. KATZ: I agree with almost everything said by
Dr. Kintner, but I derive small comfort from mere
deterrence. The more deterrence we build, the more
danger we seem to be in. The difficulty with deterrence is our overwhelming preoccupation with it, to
the exclusion of alternative policies which we should
and could have been implementing with the time we
were buying.
The military advantage which we once held over the
Soviets has disappeared. While we held it we merely
waited for them to catch up and did little beyond
that. There have been desultory efforts at reconciliation, at disarmament, at stabilization, but they have
come to nought, either because they were poor ideas
or because they were poorly implemented or because
the Soviets would have none of it. But to discuss our
security from a military standpoint alone is sheer
folly. We must somehow use the time bought by the
current military stand-off in order to work out something else, either unilaterally or multilaterally.

Secrecy-A Danger to Russia
In dealing with the Soviets on matters of arms control and stability, we are confronted with a certain
inordinate and so far intractable problem: their
passion for secrecy. They don't understand-and we
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haven't chosen to explain it to them, p'a rtly because
we hardly understand it ourselves--the disadvantages
of secrecy. They are forcing us to spend more and
more money to buy protection against weapons that
are never revealed to us. Perhaps we are spending
too much, but we can't be sure. We are like men who
are on one side of a large wall behind which are
hiding three tigers. We must protect ourselves from
the tigers. Three guns would be ample-but, not
knowing how many tig.e rs there are, we may order
17 guns. From the standpoint of the tigers and the
men alike, this is a poor policy. We would both be
better off if we put in a transparent glass.
It is up to us to demonstrate forcibly to them that
secrecy is not as valuable to them as they think it is.
They are relying upon this secrecy for protection, but
it does not really protect them. The commanding
officer of a missile station outside Moscow believes
his missile is protected, but he can never be sure.
Secrecy can evaporate ov,e rnight and he may not
know it. He would be much better off if his missile
were protected by 27* feet of concrete. And so
might we.

Missile Bookkeeping
Suppose we did know the location of their missiles
and their number. It is usually assumed that such
information would furnish target data for counterforce, but this is questionable. Even if we know
where their missiles are, it is far from certain that
they would be our primary targ.e ts. For one thing,
we may be "going second"-responding to an attack
-and the Soviet missiles may already have been
fired. And even if the missile is still there, it may
not be a good target. If it costs us three missiles to
get one missile, this is poor bookkeeping.
We must persuade them that secrecy forces the arms
r ace into higher and ever-increasing spirals; and that
there is absolutely no chance for any form of armscontrol agreement as long as secrecy goes on to its
present extent.
Secrecy works against the Russians in one other way.
In this country there is a continuous open debate in
the halls of Congress and elsewhere. So much information is made public that it is hard for anyone man
to read all the reports that come out. This continuous
debate has served to jack up our own thinking. Those
of us who work in classified material know very well
that, by and large, continuous unclassified, open
debate has served to advance the classified discussion
proceeding behind closed doors.
The Russians haven't got anything that resembles
this. I would argue-admittedly without much proof
-that their thinking must lag behind ours as a result.
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I have deliberately exaggerated this position, trying
to simplify it. But if I am correct, we should think
seriously about educating the Russians to the undesirability of secrecy.
Perhaps we might draw up a list of things we are
persuaded they ought to be more worried about than
they are. These would be things of mutual worry so
perhaps something could be done about the situation.
The danger of accidental war might be a prime
candidate for this list.
Dr. BRZEZINSKI: The Soviets have had great success at convincing us that there is an imbalance in
favor of the camp of socialism. This aneg.e d imbalance permits the Soviet Union to adopt aggressive
policies which the West accepts because it feels that
the balance is against it. But what will happen when
the Soviets feel that the objective balance actually
has turned in their favor? There are strong indications that this will occur within the next five years.
When it happens, the Soviets can be expected to
adopt policies even more extreme than those followed
in the past.
What we need to do is cut down on the Soviet
unilateral risk-taking capacity that results from our
conceding to them an increment of strength which
does not exist. We know the Soviet population is
immensely fearful of a war-more fearful perhaps
than even the American population. This is partly
because of the ignorance of the American population
as to what a war might mean, and partly because
the American population now feels the time has
come for the United States to get tough-to adopt
a policy more commensurate with its own proclaimed
objectives.

Persuading the Russians of War's Danger
But we have not responded to Soviet military threats
by conveying to the Soviet population the dangers of
war. A great deal more could be done by our media
of mass communications aimed at people behind the
Iron Curtain-notably the Voice of America-to convince the Soviet population there is indeed a very
serious danger of total destruction. For although the
Soviet people fear war, they have no sense of the
dimension of the disaster which a nuclear war would
bring to them. This ignorance is a major advantage
for the Soviet government.
There is a related point I would 'like to make. The
Russians are able to operate with a sense of security
because of what I consider to be our excessive
predictability. In this country there is a political elite
which is pacifist and aims at adjustment, compromise,
stability, the status quo. This gives the Soviets a
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sense of understanding our rationality, and allows
them to plan ev.ery move with full knowledge of how
we are likely to react.
To counter this, we must create a certain enigma of
the West, just as there is an enigma of the Soviet
Union. Perhaps someone around the President could
give the impression that this country, if pushed too
far, might respond-as the Soviet Union doesirrationally, unpredictably. This too would diminish
the Russians' capacity for risk-taking.
Finally we have to be conscious of political factors
already to the enemy's advantage, and take care that
we do not turn them further to that advantage.

Could Czechs and Poles Be Neutralized?
Here, particularly, the problem of Czechoslovakia and
Poland is relevant. The armed forces of both these
nations would be engaged in any war, if only to provide security behind the front-line zone in Germany.
It would be of the utmost importance if we could
prev.ent this stability from being achieved. Here,
again, the political factor enters into the situation. It
has been said that if we try to recognize the OderNeisse line in any way, we would let loose ten million
new Nazis in West Germany. I do not believe this;
I think democracy is in West Germany to stay. And
I think it is extremely important to us, if we wish to
create dissension within the opponent's military camp,
that we do not mobilize factors which create homogeneity and stability in his camp. Talk of resurgent
Nazism in Germany is unfortunate. We do not want
the Poles and Czechs to fight on the Soviet side. But
they will fight if they feel their national interests
are engaged.
Dr. WOLF: In view of this fear in Eastern Europe
of a G.erman military resurgence, I would like to
propose a return to the Kennan proposals for military
disengagement in Central Europe, including Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. There might be a
system of inspection and control of disarmament in
these areas. Perhaps the Soviet Union would be
willing to negotiate on this basis.

Dr. KINTNER: My own feeling is strongly against
disengagement. Not only are German arms necessary
to the NATO alliance, but to seduce Western Germany out of the alliance would be a signal to the
other European allies not to play ball with tne United
States. Western Germany has to be an integral part
of the alliance. We must embrace Germany so
strongly that it will remain wedded to the West.
As for the Soviets giving up their weapons, it is
visionary to hope for that in the near future, however much they talk about it. I believe they are
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capable of living with instability-in fact, they thrive
on it.
Perhaps in the long term, if we in the free world
show the ability to check their onrush, and they can
see we are not digestible, then, perhaps there may
be an accord. But it cannot happen until they see
their humanity and our humanity as deserving to live
on the same globe.

ECONOMICS:
Trading with the Enemy
Mr. CHERNE: Secretary of Commerce Hodges predicted recently that the industrial output of the Soviet
Union will for a long time lag behind our own. I find
no comfort in this, but rather some cause for anxiety.
First, the smaller Soviet economy does not devote its
gross national product to the luxuries of consumer
choice, the vagaries of style and conspicuous consumption. Yet this smaller economy will soon exceed
the United States in the attributes of power.
A second reason for anxiety is the ability of the
smaller Soviet economy radically to expand its trade
with the developing countries. This trade increased
almost four-fold in the last five years. Among the
nations dependent on the Soviet Union for more than
10 per cent of their total commerce are the United
Arab Republic, Iceland, Guinea, Iran, Greece, Turkey,
Finland, Iraq, Jordan, the Sudan, Cambodia and
Uruguay.
Finally, an important study by Johns Hopkins University a year ago came to the following ominous
conclusions: The Soviet Union will be spending more
than the United States for cold war purposes before
1965, and the annual increm.e nt of Soviet growth will
be larger than ours, in absolute terms. The Soviet
Union assigns a large proportion of that annual
increment to military power. Until this year, we have
provided none of it to power.

The Vast Soviet Plan
Worse is ahead. In the draft of the recent ambitious
Soviet Party Program the Kremlin set certain goals
which are impressive indeed. Their anticipated steel
output in 1980, 250 million metric tons, is almost
three times our output last year. Their expected
growth in electric power is more than three times as
much as we produced last year. Such goals cannot be
dismissed, whether or not they are precisely met.
It is not only the sheer addition to economic strength

that is ominous. There is also the psychological consequence. This consequence Walter Rostow has stated
with great effectiveness. "Soviet momentum," he said,
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"set against our sluggishness, tends to make persuasive the psychological image of an ardent competitor closing fast on a front runner who has lost
the capacity to deal with his problems and prefers to
go down in the style to which he has become accustomed rather than to make the effort required to
maintain his status." This dilemma is aggravated by
the inability of the free nations to grasp acute Soviet .)
weaknesses which, by Western will, could be substantially enlarged.
The central area of weakness in the Sovie.t world is
its persistent failures in agriculture. What have the
free nations done about this? In 1953 and 1954,
immediately after Stalin's death, at a moment of
life-or-death crisis for the Kremlin, the food-producing nations of the Western world were not at all
reluctant to sell food that helped pacify the peoples
under Communist rule.
In this present year of threatening nuclear war, the
entire Communist world is caught in acute agricultural collapse-the worst disaster that has afflicted
the Communist leaders in more than a generation.
What have we done? We have assisted them to meet
the human problem they face.
What is Western policy toward the Soviet world?
What, in fact, is Western policy even closer to home?
Is there adequate reason for the' 25 millions which
are spent for goods exported by Castro's Cuba?
Would the United States really suffer desperately if
our cigars were not enshrouded in Havana wrappers?
Lenin was reputed to have said, "When the time
comes for us to hang the capitalists, they will rush
to sell us the rope."

The Difficult Role of West Germany
If I were to advance one reason for a Western policy,
it would be the pressure which our own lack of policy
imposes upon one of our most important allies, West
Germany. The growing recognition of two Germanies,
the permanent division of Berlin, the increasing
clamor for nuclear sterilization of Germany-all these
serve to strengthen those who might well be eag.e r to
see the most sharply enlarged commercial relationships between Germany and the U.S.S.R.
In this year of intensified Berlin crisis, the value of
West German trade with the Soviet bloc countries
increased by 24 per cent. Trade directly with the
Soviet Union increased 43 per cent. Let me make
clear, I am pointing no finger of accusation. -During
this identical interval, the United States has participated in a somewhat similar increased trade with the
Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. If a trade is somehow detached from war and peace, then by what logic
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would we expect that German industry would be less
eager to satisfy the Soviets' need for sophisticated
industrial output than Canada, which is quite ready
to reduce the agricultural stress suffered by Red
China.
'
What is an appropriate economic policy that will
enable freedom to prevail? It is urgent, in my judgment, to recognize that when we trade with the Soviet
Union and mainland China we advance strength
which has as its primary purpose our defeat. We
need a government apparatus capable of conducting
economic warfare. We need among the free nations
an apparatus to prevent our competition with each
other from hastening the day of our decline.

Strange Workings of Western Trade
The one existing organization designed to coordinate Western trade-CO COM, the 21-nation Coordinating Committee in Paris----:.works in strange ways,.
indeed. Take the recent example of ball-bearing
machinery to be sold to the U.S.S.R. The United
States came prepared to vote negatively, which
should have done the trick, since only the United
States has the technological ability to build such
machines. Yet, the other COCOM nations voted to
allow the deal-and the United States, as a loyal
member, went along. Many of the CO COM countries
have two policies on trade-COCOM policy and their
own government's policy. When these two are at
variance, they choose whichever they think is best
at the moment. The result can be seen in Hong Kong,
through which Canada recently air-freighted a big
shipment of goods for Cuba.
What I am advocating is a tougher attitude toward
economic warfare. I suggest that it is time we fight
fire with fire. We need a growing understanding
within our community that our economic assistance
must have a purpose beyond the genuine need of the
countries which require our assistance. We cannot
assist equally those whose future is with freedom
and those whose understanding of the value of
freedom is far less clear.
The economic price of freedom is escalating. It will
cost us all more to increase the rate of growth of
the American economy. It will cost more to increase
the annual increment of our growth applied to military strength and cold war expenditures.
The normal impulses of a peacetime private-enterprise system cannot be the guiding impulses of a
nation facing the possibility of defeat. We cannot as
separate-though-allied nations separately hang ourselves or . each other. There is reason, in fact, to
question whether we can long remain separate-alto-
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gether separate-political and economic entities. We
are approaching a moment of test so severe that the
Atlantic Community may well, in fact, face the choice
of indeed becoming a community-or a figure of
speech in a historian's reference to a group of nations
that died.

Mr. MAY: I agree with Mr. Cherne that the problem
is how to meet the Soviet economic challenge effectively. But I disagree with his prescription for conducting economic warfare. Rather than simply ruling
out trade with the Communist world, we should be
seeking ways to trade with them on our terms rather
than theirs.
The two trading systems are completely different.
Theirs is monolithic, completely responsive to their
political and foreign strategy purposes. The Western
world's is much more difficult to manage. But it is
ridiculous for us to trade on their terms, as a great
part of the Western World is doing-through bilateral agreements, through a series of barter swaps
in many cases-and particularly ridiculous to allow
a set of terms to apply to that trade that we don't
apply to most of our own trade.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Under GATT, we have simple rules for our Western
trade. We say that dumping is not allowable and we
define dumping very specifically: offering articles at
a lower price than prevails in the domestic market;
offering articles to one country at a price lower than
to another country; offering them at a price that is
lower than the cost of production plus the reasonable
cost of conducting the trade.
The bookkeeping on some of these rules is hard to
apply to Communist trade. But on others it is ' surprisingly easy to apply. When applied, it shows that
virtually all of their trade falls outside the rules we
enforce among ourselves. Unfortunately, the GATT
principles that define what you can do about it-which is to have offsetting tariffs of a punitive or a
protective nature-are permissive rather than compulsory. Nevertheless, we have machinery and we are
building more. We have the NATO and SEATO
groups, and it would be very logical for them to agree
severally to apply this. We are building up the OECD
to control most of the word's trade and to provide a
forum for discussing this kind of question.
By taking strong steps we can rob trade between the
East and the West of its very insidious characterthat is, as an instrument to promote Communist
political ends by disrupting the world-trade system
in which we are engaged.
Dr. MOSELY: I question whether it is to our interest
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to adopt a position of all-out hostility toward the
Soviet Union in the economic field. Will this be effective in what we want? Will it possibly be inconsistent
with our desire to move toward a strengthening of
international organizations and a really effective
system of arms control, which they now reject but
which they may find to their advantag.e to accept at
a later time?
Agreement in these areas would, of course, only move
the struggle from the nuclear-missile field into other
fields. But I f.eel that in these fields the West, with
its resources and its goals of national and individual
freedom, has a tremendous advantage over the Soviet
Union. Many of the countries now dealing closely
with the U.S.S.R. will become less enthusiastic about
it. Egypt, for exalilple, has learned many lessons by
dealing with the Soviet Union. If we had succeeded in
preventing them from dealing with the Soviet Union,
they wouldn't have learned these lessons. The same is
true of India.
Mr. CHERNE: The comments of Mr. May and Professor Mosely are directed essentially to our capacity
to resist and to remain uninjured by Soviet economic
warfare upon us. But the problem is still this: what
are we doing with our very substantial strength,
unequalled by the Soviets, that serves to weaken them
significantly? Time is on their side, not ours.
Mr. HARRIS: I would like to urge a stepped-up
program of economic collaboration among the free
nations. We should think more seriously about the
advantages to be derived from the establishment of
a NATO economic general staff, a high command to
develop a common economic strategy for the. nations
of the Atlantic community. This offers many obvious
advantages; not the least would be the tying-together
of economic, military and diplomatic considerations.
But there are also three less obvious advantages:
First, by moving in this direction we could at least
begin to overcome our present state of stumbling
somnambulism which is called a foreign-economic
policy. Under this policy, with all of its contradictions
in trade, in tariff, and in customs procedures, we keep
preaching the virtues of political internationalism
while retreating into the practices of economic
isolationism.
Second, it seems to me that such an approach could
bring a new measure of economic vitality and a sense
of purpose to our free economies, which are, after all
mixed economies. If limited only to the NATO powers
in terms of the market, it would apply to 550 million
people, with their combined resources in manpower,
machinery, materials, management know-how, scientific and technological talent. Once that were made
p
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an operational and effective unit, we could start to
work in concert and in a coher.ent fashion to extend
aid and trade in a new pattern to the underdeveloped
areas.
There is a third perhaps startling effect which a move
in this direction could achieve. As the economic power
of the West expanded under such a plan, extending
the frontiers not only of economic freedom but also
of political freedom, the Communist bloc might find
itself being worsted in economic competition. It
might, therefore, be compelled to divert to consumer
goods those resources which now go into its gigantic
armaments build-up, in order to hold its place in the
new world-trading pattern. If it did that, and perhaps
only if it did that, then it would listen realistically to
some first proposals toward an effective arms-control
agreement.

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES:
Propaganda and the Truth
Mr. ALLEN: In sending information abroad our aims
should be to present the news honestly and believably.
But these criteria of objectivity and cre.d ibility raise
certain problems.
Should we send out unfavorable news along with the
favorable? Should the Voice of America tell the
world about Little Rock?
Of course we should. Yet an honest difference arises
over the context in which we show the Little Rock
story. Should we admit to our listeners, for example,
that the duly elected Governor of Arkansas had called
on the citizens of his state to refuse to allow Negroes
to attend schools with white children, but follow this
closely with a reminder that more Negroes obtain
university degrees in the United States each year
than in the r.e.st of the world combined?
This is a much harder question to decide. I was in
New Delhi during the distressing events in Little
Rock. Several Indian newspapers, served by the
United Pre.ss, asked to have two columns of American
news a day-solely on the Little Rock story, although
various matters of real concern to India were being
decided in Washington and New York.

Sensationalism or Whitewash 1
I had an opportunity to discuss the Little Rock story
at about this time with a high official of the UP. He
pointed out that the insertion of background could be
misleading unless done with propriety. If, for example, background were injected in a way so as to
minimize the actual situation in Little Rock, it would
not be good reporting, in his view. I accused him of
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sensationalism to sell his news service. He accused me
of wanting to whitewash the ugly facts of Little
Rock. Perhaps there was an element of truth jn both
accusations. What kind of propaganda we should
send out is easy to state-we should send straight
news-but difficult to decide in specific cases.
This brings us to a further question. Who should
decide what the Voice of America says? How much
press comment should be carried, and from what
newspapers?
In my view, the Voice of America should have a
clear-cut charter from the President and Congress,
authorizing it to broadcast the news in as straightforward and honest a manner as humanly possible,
including a balanced cross-section of political and
editorial comment. The Voice of America should be
free from day-to-day supervision by either the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
To achieve this, the Voice of America should be
detached from the USIA and put under the direction
of a non-partisan board of 12 or 15 outstanding
citizens of the United States, recognized for their
devotion to straight news reporting. Congress would
still have an opportunity to review the agency's
operations annually in connection with the appropriations. But it would be a non-partisan review, since
Voice of America would be non-partisan.
There have been many reports that the BBC enjoys
greater credibility than the Voice of America. This
may be true, at least in part. BBC has several advantages over us. First, it is primarily a domestic
operation, to which its overseas broadcasts are an
important but secondary adjunct. All political parties
in Britain watch BBC scripts with the closest scrutiny, quick to complain against any evidence of bias.
BBC's overseas broadcasts, again, are intended primarily for English-speaking listeners; its foreign
language programs are secondary. This adds to its
credibility, as the following example will illustrate.

.BBC Broadcasts to Greece
In 1956, the Greeks were quarreling bitterly with
Great Britain oV.e r the Cyprus situation. BBC was
broadcasting to Greece every day in the Greek language, but very few Greeks would bother to listen
since they felt certain that any broadcast meant only
for Greek listeners would be one-sided, hence propaganda. Yet the Greek Foreign Minister told me that
he never left his home in the morning until after the
8 o'clock BBC news in English. He knew that such
broadcasts, intended for the English-speaking world,
were more likely to contain straightforward, unbiased
news.
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Winston Churchill's grumble during the last war that
the BBC was "too damned neutral" goes far to
explain the BBC's credibility.
The Voice of America has had the advantage over
the BBC on more than one occasion but day in and
day out I must give grudging and envied recognition
to BBC's high reputation. I do not believe the Voice
of America will or can achieve this status until it is
controlled by a non-partisan board under a well
understood and stubbornly supported charter defining
its terms of reference.
If our broadcasts are not believed, we will waste our

time and money. Our programs, to be credible, must
contain as little propaganda as is humanly possible.
Mr. RICHARDSON: I think it is proper that the
USIA should disseminate both straight information
and United States' positions as exemplified by the
statements of its leaders. But I would also assume,
in the context of the cold war, that we are interested
in affecting attitudes and actions of other peoples in
the world. In this regard I would think that through
one agency or another we should first decide what
attitudes and actions we seek, and second, provide
techniques to produce them.
This may mean one thing in one area, something else
in another. Radio Free Europe, to a very limited
extent, in broadcasting to a few countries of East
Central Europe, does endeavor consciously to affect
attitudes, though scarcely actions. But it can be effective only insofar as over-all policy makes it effective.
In view of the political and psychological struggle in
which we are engaged, it might be useful for us here
to consider ways of affecting the attitudes and actions
of other peoples-behind the Iron Curtain and this
side of it, as well as in the uncommitted areas-in
directions which are positive in terms of United
States policy.
Dr. KINr:fNER: I was about to make the same point.
We do have a problem in distinguishing between the
proper role of information and the proper way of
somehow getting people to move in a direction which
we think is favorable.
There are instrumentalities that can be used to influence people. For example, some of us are pretty well
identified with the United States Government, even
though we may officially disclaim any such connection, and our statements bear corresponding weight.
There are also the great influences of our motion
pictures, our newspapers, and our other information
media. But the Communists use outright propaganda.
Whether it is true or false makes little difference;
eventually it enables them to mobilize actions on
their behalf.
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I would like Mr. Allen to give his views as to howwhether through private mechanisms or public mechanisms-we can get across the things we stand for,
and deflate the lies told by the opposition. How do
you aid the truth?

Mr. ALLEN. Basically, I think the same problem is
posed for the government as for any loyal American
running a private news association or a great newspaper. If you had the editorial board of The New
York Ti'l'Ybes here discussing this question, they would
approach it from the point of view that nobody wants
to give our country a black eye, or to change the
things that make it possible for The TiWJes to be
published in an atmosphere of freedom. Yet The
Tim;e8' basic principle is "All the News that's Fit to
Print."
That is the great dilemma. Weare all fallible and
there is just so much a human being can do. You
have to keep in mind when you speak of being an
advocate for any viewpoint, that the fellows on the
receiving end are not Americans. They are usually
predisposed to be rather skeptical toward what they
ar,e going to hear. In order to be effective, in order
to be credible, in order to persuade anybody, we are
not going to get far pushing our own point of view.
Mr. STEIBEL: Mr. Allen, I think you were associated
with the drive within USIA to get more participation
in the policy-making phases of gov.ernment. Once you
achieve this, how can you ask to be free of supervision and simply allowed to follow the dictates of
truth? You say we should take the Voice of America
out of government and set it up under a board. But
this still leaves you with two problems. One, as a
policy-maker, for whom do you speak in the minds
of your listeners; of Whom are you the voice? And,
second, suppose you have the problem, as you do now,
of convincing audiences that our position on Berlin is
credible. Suppose the chairman of your non-partisan
committee doesn't happen to like this as a policy?
He may be a pacifist, or something else. Doesn't this
still leave you with the original problem, which is
that somebody has to speak officially in the name of
the United States Government, and that he cannot,
therefore, be disassociated from all of its decisions?
Mr. ALLEN: I think the answer is simple. I said I
thought the radio program, the Voice of America,
ought to be put under a non-partisan board. The rest
of the activity of the United States Information
Agency would certainly remain as it is, and the
efforts of the head of the agency to be an important
official in government could even be redoubled. He
would have his influence in the councils of government. But the pronouncements about our foreign
policy would be made primarily by the President, the
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Secretary of State, and so forth. The Voice of
America would be able to voice those. The announcer
doesn't have to be the originator of statements of
policy.
Mr. DEAC: I would like to say something on behalf
of the foreign-born groups in the United States.
These groups have been very disappointed ever since
1945. We Americans have let the world down; we
have let ourselves down; we have let our principles
down; and we have let our guard down as well. It
was heartwarming to hear Mr. Drummond say that
there is a large segment of our opinion that knows
what it wants and is way ahead of our political
leadership. That is true.
Speaking for the ethnic groups, I can say that they
are way ahead of our political leadership in both
parties. We would suggest one thing to our government leaders: don't g,e t soft, because there has been
too much softness already. Get tough. That is the
only language the Communists understand. Don't be
afraid of public opinion. Public opinion is asking you
to show the way.
In propaganda, we believe our ethnic groups are
more knowledg.e able than most Americans. But these
groups, which have excellent relations around the
world and which are better placed than other Americans to make friends around the world, have been
systematically excluded from our propaganda effort.

Mr. EMMET: I would like to take exception to
Ambassador Allen's basic thesis. The idea of having
a committee of newsmen run the Voice is fantastic.
We have two problems.
One is that in the captive nations people are risking
their lives to listen to us. They are not interested in
spot news, in airplane accidents or earthquakes. They
want to know whether we are going to win, what
hope they have that we will act on one policy. They
don't want to know whether we are of two minds.
Two, when it comes to our allies, they want to know
what we are talking about. Instead of doing what
Mr. Allen suggested, I would say the opposite. Put
the libraries in the hands of newsmen, but put the
Voice, the fighting element of our operation, in the
hands of people who can combine the functions of
teachers and advertisers.
I was in England in 1954 when Senator McCarthy
was at his height. Why wasn't the United States
Information Agency telling the British how a McCarthy could exist in our country? Why didn't t4ey tell
the history of American Congressional Committees?
There was no way of quoting the President; the
President didn't dare talk about McCarthy.
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Mr. ALLEN: Thank you for gIVIng me the best
illustration I could possibly have thought of for my
own case. You asked why the Voice of America wasn't
telling the British about McCarthy. Because the
Voice of America was part of the Administration.
There were a few bold souls brave enough to speak
out about McCarthyism, but they didn't last long.
The Voice of America was under the domination of
Senator McCarthy.
Mrs. OVERSTREET: In what additional ways besides the Voice of America can the U. S. communicate
with other peoples?
Mr. ALLEN: We use every means humanly possible.
In many areas of the world, motion pictures and
documentary films are more effective than anything
.else. In Belgrade, the United States Information
Library is on the main drag. At one time, when
relations between the United States and Yugoslavia
were tense, word went around that it was dangerous
for a man's reputation to be seen inside our library.
We had windows on the str.eet and put up pictures
every week of what was going on; the place was
jammed every night. It stopped traffic.
In Russia we have a hard time reaching the people,
but we did reach three million through our exhibit
in Moscow in 1958.
We work with American travelers, with tourists.
Mrs. Overstreet, I know how effective you and your
husband have been on the platform in foreign countries. Whatever can be done by human ingenuity,
we do.
Dr. MOSELY: In this respect I would like to say just
a word about the cultural revolution which has taken
place in perhaps 60 countries around the world, and
to urge that, in addition to strategic and economic
and political programs, we need to do a great deal
more in the field of education, communications, and
cultural development. Let me giv.e you just one or
two examples.
In India we were handicapped for more than ten
years by the fact that Soviet books, in English, were
being sold for a very small prie&-10, 15, 25 cents,
and textbooks for the equivalent of 50 cents. For
many years, we couldn't sell American books. But
now the American Book Council has a program, with
the aid of the United States Government, to have
American books reprinted in India and sold at Indian
prices. They are still higher than Soviet books, but
our experience so far is that the Indian intellectuals,
by and large, would rather pay the equivalent of 75
cents or one dollar for a book they want to read,
than 15 or 25 cents for a book that is not only dull
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but full of dogmatism. We ought to multiply these
examples around the world.
There is room for a whole revolution in techniques
of book production and sales. Many .of you are
familiar with the program of the Franklin Publications which is working toward this .end. They don't
tell the people what books they should print, but
offer them a choice, help them identify their needs.
In several countries the revolution has already occurred-in book publishing, bookselling, libraries,
including mobile libraries in Iran.
But we need to do much more than we are doing to
train people f.or journalism, for responsible work in
analysis of world affairs, as .e ducators, as businessmen, as entrepreneurs.
If the world strategic situation, which these countries

can affect very much, ever comes into a kind of
balance, perhaps the final decisions ultimately will be
made by people that we will (or will not) have aided
to make their own ch.oices. I think that answers, in
part, the question about what we have to offer. We
offer something the Soviets cannot offer-though
they pretend to offer it--and that is a real choice of
things, the techniques, the knowledge that the ambitious people of these countries want.

SUMMATION:
Renewing Our Intellectual Armament
Dr. GIDEONSE: The key idea in Ambassador Wadsworth's address seemed to me to be that "this must
be the last crisis to which we come unprepared." But
what is preparation? First of all, it is awareness of
the larger strategy as against the last emerging,
immediate issue in the headlines. As far as the last
fifteen years is concerned, determining the larger
strategy has not been a great source of difficulty.
We had our eye on the larger strategy when we
inaugurated the Marshall Plan, despite the difficulties
posed by traditional ways of thinking in the United
States. We bridged those difficulties primarily through
a link between the Democratic Party and Republican
Senator Vandenberg in the Senate. We did a magnificent job with the Marshall Plan, a b.etter job of its
kind than I think has ever before been done in
economic and political history. In fact, we did so w&ll
that the nations of Western Europe now talk back to
us-so vigorously that we might almost wish for
some of the docility of pre-Marshall Plan days.
The organization of the North Atlantic military
alliance-NATO-was another superior job of carrying forward the larger strategy.
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A third example was the substitution of United
States responsibility for British in the Communistthreatened Near and Middle East. This move, usually
described, as "The Truman Doctrine," began in
Greece and Turkey and led to Lebanon and other
episodes.
A Larger Strategy

The question now is whether we still have that grasp
of the larger strategy in what President Kennedy
has called this crucial decade of the Sixties. A good
example of the dilemma was presented by Dr. Brzezinski when he reminded us that the formula that
saves us Berlin could lose us West Germany-and
ultimately NATO and Western Europe.
I found Mr. Berle's remarks very refreshing because
a liberal who re-thinks his basic presuppositions is
even scarcer and more surprising than a conservative
who does it. This was a beautiful example of a firstclass mind offering a re-orientation of our thinking
about what he termed "the myth of world opinion."
The thing that emerges in almost all these discussions
is the need f.or yardsticks, standards by which we
can judge the immediate issues before us in terms of
strategic policy. We need something to help us make
up 'Our mind which really is the most important use
of scarce resources-economic, military, whatever it
may be. Dr. Kissinger used the phrase that we need
a concept of the free world that "informs 'Our action."
It also has been said here that if the Common Market
is considered as a concept that should be enlarged
to include the whole Atlantic Community, it could
give an additional dynamic to our ideological position.
This is the one thing that is badly needed in-to name
one instance--Western Europe. The students there,
misled though they may be in our judgment, still see
a dynamic in the Soviet philosophy; they miss it in
our position.

The Predictable Consequences
There is also another idea that emerged again and
again in these discussions, and that is the way in
which we tend to analyze our opponents. We want to
know what they are really thinking, as compared
with what they say and what the traditional positions
of Lenin, Stalin and the past positions of Khrushchev
have been. At the same time I think there was a very
healthy realization-pragmatic and therefore truly
American - that the really basic question is not
what our opponents believe, but what are the predictable consequences of what they are doing. This
is something we lose sight of in our day-by-day
search for a negotiating formula on Berlin. What
are the predictable consequences in West Germany
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of what they are doing? If there is some form of
neutralization of West Germany, and if there is then
some form of recognition of the repression in Central
Europe, with the demoralization that would ensue
for all the peoples in that strategically crucial area,
you have a picture of what I mean by predictable
consequences. We thereby would completely lose the
cutting edge of our traditional appeal to the minds
of free men. If we lose that, we are reduced to practically nothing but the military and material factors.
I dare say that would be just about the least advantageous position we could put ourselves in.
Kissinger pointed out that we must on the one hand
restore that cutting edge by some form of widening
and integration of the idea by which we live, and
must on the -o ther concern ourselves more imaginatively with the question of what are the legitimate
security factors in Russia's thinking as contrasted
to the ones that are called security but are really
aggressive imperialist intentions.
This is hard to do because, as many people have said,
there is a great deal of hypocrisy in Russian talk
about their security.
On the one hand, therefore, you have the need to
widen the economic and military and political base
of an Atlantic Community; on the other, there is the
need for greater awareness of the legitimacy of
Russia's concern for her security.
The Meaning of Freedom

I c·ome back to what is, to me, perhaps the greatest
weakness in our armament. It is not technical and
not economic, important as those factors are. It is
that we lack clarity in spelling out for our time the
meaning of the word "freedom." No thought emerged
moo re frequently than that one in these discussions.
This is an old theme, but it has been refreshed by our
discussions here. Too often w.e simply take freedom
for granted. Our specialists are all concerned with
little splinters of the log. They don't concern themselves with the larger questions. "That," they say,
"is somebody else's specialty." But that "somebody
else" doesn't exist; we must all carry part of the load.
There is an abiding need for high-quality concern
with the nature of our intellectual armament. For one
thing, we keep talking about tension or insecurity as
if it were something regrettable that has to be removed. Sure enough, some kinds of tension and
insecurity should be removed, if we can do so~ But
let me remind you, a free society that will inform our
action and be true to our historic experience cannot
be developed without promoting ins.ecurity. Wherever
there is freedom of choice, there is insecurity for
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those whose ideas are not chosen. Freedom and
insecurity are inherently interwoven; they belong
together.
Freedom is not an abstraction to be defined by philosophers. Freedom is defined by the historic experience
of free men. It is always characterized by the presence of choice, the right to pursue human values and
purposes, and the guaranty of human and civil rights.
It calls for the limited state, that is to say a constitution which places the government as well as the
governed under law.
All these historic achievements are rooted in a certain
image of man-not just man as a producer and as a
consumer who is expected to contribute to production,
but the whole man with all his esthetic, moral, and
religious aspirations. This image of man sees him as
a potential angel as well as a potential devil. It
reminds us that the danger of the potential devil
submerging the potential angel is enlarged in direct
proportion to the extent that man is entrusted with
unlimited power.
The progress of science and technology demonstrates
that whatever enhances man's power over his physical environment without strengthening his capacity
for self-control is pernicious. The free society depends
upon refreshing the sources of responsibility-the
opportunity for self-control.

The Will to Win
Mr. MOWRER: I came here thinking that free men
could prevail, and I go back certain that they can.
Unhappily, I am not sure that they will. The mere
choice of the title of this assembly-"How Free Men
Can Prevail"-gives away the game, for it assumes
that they are not yet prevailing.
Everybody now sees that we have the means of
winning. And yet we are not winning. Certainly it is
not for lack of trying. But it is for lack of trying to
do the right thing. It seems to me we have been
trying, not to prevail, but to survive. Our problem
is not to put off crises and gain a little time. It is to
win the cold war.
What is needed was once expressed by ~ethe who,
in figuring out why God created Germany, said, "In
the beginning was the deed; and that deed on the
part of the Lord I feel sure was an act of will."
Only when we have demonstrated this "act of will"
will things fall into shape.
Once we have faced the inexorable fact that we need
to win if we are to survive, then surely we will find
that a prolongation of peace by concessions is only
bringing war nearer. Each time it merely seems to
provoke a desir.e for more concessions, and so we
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come closer to that horrible day when we shall really
be asked to engage in major war or surrender.
On the other hand, by deciding to win, we reduce the
chances of war. By mobilizing all of our superior
energies, our superior resources, our superior philosophy, we have what it takes to win. By creating a
permanent preponderance over our adversary and his
underworld philosophy, we will develop such a barrier
to further trouble that we will find that we may not
have to win. Once we have decided that nothing short
of prevalence will do the job, we have a chance of
convincing the adversary. Only when we convince the
adversary that he will never win will we have a
chance of bringing about within the Soviet Union,
Red China, and the other Communist nations those
transformations which would enable the conflict to
subside.
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